Volume 69

Issue 3

Article 9

April 1967

Reevaluation of the Dead Man's Statute
Ronald R. Brown
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald R. Brown, Reevaluation of the Dead Man's Statute, 69 W. Va. L. Rev. (1967).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol69/iss3/9

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Brown: Reevaluation of the Dead Man's Statute

STUDENT NOTE

Reevaluation of the Dead Man's Statute
The law of evidence, as in many other areas of the law, has
been greatly influenced by the early English common law. An
example of this influence is apparent in the subject of competency
of witnesses. The common law in England made certain persons
incompetent as witnesses such as those who were parties to a
proceeding or bad a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a proceeding.' However, during the latter part of the nineteenth century,
England completely abrogated this exclusionary rule in civil cases.'
Influenced by this change in England, several state legislatures
passed statutes to enlarge the competency of witnesses, however,
many jurisdictions retained an exception popularly known as the
"dead man's statute".
The typical statute provides, in essence, that no person shall be
incompetent as a witness because of his interest in a proceeding or
his being a party thereto, but parties and interested persons are
incompetent to testify as to any transactions or communications
with an insane person or a person since deceased.3 The explanation
proffered by the courts for retaining this exception was that the
exception is necessary to prevent one party from having an unfair
'2 WiMoBE, EvENcE § 576 (3d ed. 1940).
2 McCowmcE, EVmENCE § 65 (1954).
3 The West Virginia statute provides in full "No person offered as a
witness in any civil action, suit or proceeding, shall be excluded by
reason of his interest in the event of the action, suit or proceeding, or
because he is a party thereto, except as follows: No party to any
action, suit or proceeding, nor any person from, through or under
whom any such party or interested person derives any interest or
title by assignment or otherwise, shall be examined as a witness in
regard to any personal transaction or communication between such
witness and a person at the time of such examination, deceased, insane or lunatic, against the executor, administrator, heir at law, next
of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee or survivor of such person, or the
assignee or committee of such insane person or lunatic. But this
prohibition shall not extend to any transaction or communication as
to which any such executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin,
assignee, legatee, devisee, survivor or committee shall be examined on
his own behalf, nor as to which the testimony of such deceased person
or lunatic shall be given in evidence: Provided, however, that where
an action is brought for causing the death of any person by any
wrongful act, neglect or default under article seven (-§55-7-1 et seq.),
chapter fifty-five of this Code, the person sued, shall have the right
to give evidence in any case in which he or it is sued, but he may
not give evidence of any conversation with the deceased." W. VA. CODE
ch. 57, art. 3 § 1 (Michie 1966); [Hereinafter cited as W. VA. CoDE,
§ 57-3-1].
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advantage in bringing an action against an administrator for a
deceased person or a committee for an insane person. The primary
aim of this section of the statute was to remove the strong temptation for false swearing.! The West Virginia court taking cognizance
of these reasons has declared, "it is the firm public policy of this
State, as expressed by that statute, for obvious reasons, that the
person who is living shall not be permitted to testify regarding
any personal transaction, or communication between him and the
deceased person."' The court has also noted that "one party shall
not be heard if the other is insane enough to be disabled from
giving evidence."6
Different courts in interpreting "dead man's statutes" have
reached conflicting results. Consequently, a decision rendered in
one state usually has little persuasive weight in aiding a court in
a sister state in interpreting its statute. Even a court's interpretation of a dead man's statute in a single state are often ambiguous
and conflicting and this makes it extremely difficult to detemine
the exact meaning of the statute. As the American Bar Association's
Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence pointed
out, "in one State alone, a textbook devotes nearly 400 pages to the
interpretation of a 14 line statute."7 Due to the complexity and
harshness of these statutes, they have been subjected to severe
criticism and their desirability has been questioned by many
outstanding legal writers.8 Therefore, it is the purpose of this
note to present a brief survey of the application, interpretation and
administration of the dead man's statute and to examine possible
alternatives to the typical prohibitive type of dead man's statute.
4 Griswold v. Hart, 205 N.Y. 384, 98 N.E. 918 (1912).
5 Mullins v. Green, 143 W. VA. 888, 105 S.E.2d 542 (1958); Cf. Owens
v. Owen's Adm't., 14 W. Va. 88 (1878).
6 Hinkson v. Ervin, 40 W. Va. 111, 20 S.E. 849 (1894).
7 2 Wimom, op. cit. supra note 1, § 578a.
8 Dean Wigmore has described the inadequacy of the statute as follows:
"As a matter of policy, this survival of the now discarded interest disqualifiin every respect; for it is based upon a fallacious and
cation
is deplorable
exploded
principle, it leads to as much or more false decision than it prevents, and it encumbers the profession with a profuse mass of barren quibbles
over the interpretation of mere words." 2 Wimox, op. cit. supra note 1,
§ 578; Professor McCormick had this to say about the statute, 'Most commentators agree that here again the expedient of refusing altogether to listen
to the survivor is in the words of Bentham, a 'blind and brainless technique'.
In seeking to avoid injustice to one side, the statute-makers have ignored the
equal possibility of injustice to the other." McCoaMcx, op. cit. supra note
2, § 65.
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In examining a dead man's statute, it is important to determine
what types of action the statute contemplates. The question as to
what types of action the statute will be applicable depends upon the
particular language of each statute and the court's construction of
that language. Since the primary purpose of the statute is to
prevent one party from having an unfair advantage in bringing an
action against an administrator for a deceased person or a committee for an insane person, it is obvious that it was not intended
to be applicable to every type of action.'
Several states have statutes which apply in any action involving
an executor or administrator as plaintiff or defendant in his
representative capacity. The West Virginia statute is applicable
whenever a party or interested witness attempts to testify to a
party or interested witness attempts to testify to a personal transaction or communication with a deceased or insane person against
an executor or administrator of the deceased person or committee
of the insane person. Therefore, the statute would be applicable
irrespective of whether the executor, administrator or committee
would be a plaintiff or a defendant in an action.'" Statutes in other
states, however, apply only when a suit is instituted against the
executor or administrator as defendant." The latter type provision
may not give an estate protection when the executor or administrator brings an action as contrasted to when he defends one.' 2
West Virginia's statute not only applies to actions involving an
insane person and the administrator or executor of a deceased
person but extends the protection to "an heir at law, next of kin,
assignee, legatee, devisee, or survivor of such person, or the assignee
or committee of such insane person."' 3 The reason for extending
the protection to these particular persons is the possibility of a
party having an unfair advantage is just as great against them as
it is against an insane person or the administrator or executor of
a deceased person. Thus, even though a witness may be interested
in the outcome of an action or be a party to an action, his testimony
9For the general law of the states other than West Virginia, the writer
has relied mostly upon the scholarly work of Mr. Roy R. Ray on Dead Man'rs
Statutes, in 24 Omo ST. L.J. 89 (1963).
10 See New House v. England, 118 W. Va. 649, 191 S.E. 525 (1937).
11Ray Dead Man's Statutes, 24 Ouro ST. L.J. 89 (1963).
12 Ibid.
,3 W. VA.

CODE,

§ 57-3-1.
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will be admissible unless it is offered as evidence against one of the
designated persons enumerated in the statute. 4 However, this
statement is not completely true, because the court has declared
that the word "assignee" also includes the word "grantee"."s
The dead man's statutes generally are applicable, either expressly or by judicial interpretation to any civil suit or proceeding.
The West Virginia court has held that its statute is not limited "to
cases arising ex contractu, nor to those in which there may be a
judgment for or against the estate of the decedent .
1.."6 The
court stated that this conclusion is in harmony with the construction
given to the New York statute. The New York court has held
that its statute only applies to civil and not to criminal actions.' 7
Therefore, the West Virginia statute, by inference, would not be
applicable to criminal proceedings. However, the statute does
apply to actions involving negligent injury.'"
While the West Virginia statute clearly applies in tort, as well
as contract actions, its applicability is expressly limited in wrongful
death actions.' 9 The statute was amended in 1937 to provide, in
essence, that when a person is sued in a wrongful death action he
shall be competent to testify to any personal transaction or communication with the deceased except that he shall remain incompetent to testify to any conversation he may have had with the
deceased.
While the dead man's statutes usually will be applied in the
types of action which have been described above, several statutes
14 Shuman v. Shuman, 79 W. Va. 445, 91 S.E. 264 (1917);
Board of
Education v. Harvey, 70 W. Va. 480, 74 S.E. 507 (1912).
15 William James Sons Co. v. Hutchinson, 73 W. Va. 488, 80 S.E. 768
(1914); Zane v. Fink, 18 W. Va. 693 (1881).
16 Lawrence v. Hyde, 77 W. Va. 639, 644, 88 S.E. 45 (1916).
,7 RxcHmwsON, EVIDENCE § 414 (1955).
18 See Strode v. Dyer, 115 W. Va. 733, 177 S.E. 878 (1934).
This case
involves an action for wrongful death, and it seems to be an open question
in West Virginia wbether or not the statute would be applicable in a negligent injury case when one brings an action against a deceased, to recover for
personal injuries, when such deceased person dies from an indepedent cause
before suit is brought.
19 W. VA. CODE, 57-3-1.
The limitation reads, "Provided, however, that
where an action is brought for causing the death of any person by any

wrongful act, neglect or default under article seven .

. .

. chapter fifty-five

of this Code, the person sued, or the servant, agent or employee of any firm
or corporation sued, shall have the right to give evidence in any case in
which he or it is sued, but he may not give evidence of any conversation
with the deceased."
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provide for exceptions where the statute will not be invoked and
the person who otherwise would be disqualified will be permitted
to testify. West Virginia's statute contains certain exceptions and
provides that the disqualification of parties or interested persons
shall not extend to any transaction or communication to which
any persons protected by the statute could be examined on their
own behalf.2 The court has held that the true construction to be
placed on this exception is that when the testimony of one of the
designated persons claiming under the deceased is given in evidence, then the adverse party or claimant shall be rendered competent to testify and give his version of the transaction or communication." In an action brought by an administrator to settle
his accounts as administrator, the court denied D's claim on a
promissory note given by deceased because it was given without
consideration. The administrator made D his own witness and
attempted to prove the lack of consideration by D's own testimony.
The court held that even though D's own testimony, as to why the
note was given to her, would have been incompetent under the
statute, the administrator waived this disqualification by making
D his own witness. 2 The court in Coleman v. Wallace,2 stated
the rule to be "where the executor or other personal representative
of an estate testifies against the claim of an interested party, such
testimony under the statute serves to open the case for complete
inquiry concerning the transactions testified to by such executor
or other personal representative." In this case, however, the court
ruled that when an administrator simply testifies to the assertion
of the adverse party's claim and gives no testimony in support or
denial of that claim the door will not be opened in order that
the adverse party may testify. The rule stated in the Coleman
case also applies to distributees of the decedent,24 and the grantee
of the deceased,2" as well as the other specific persons mentioned
in the statute including the deceased. For example, if the deceased
2

0 W. VA. CODE, 57-3-1.
The language reads, "But this prohibition
shall not extend to any transaction or communication as to which any such
executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee legatee, devisee,
survivor or committee shall be examined on his own behalf nor as to which
the testimony of such deceased person or lunatic shall be given in evi-

dence ....

"

Kimmel v. Shroyer, 28 W. Va. 505 (1886).
22 Ogdin v. Bank, 103 W. Va. 665, 138 S.E. 376 (1927).
23 143 W. Va. 669, 104 S.E.2d 349 (1958).
24
Painter v. Long, 69 W. Va. 765, 72 S.E. 1092 (1911).
25 Curtis v. Curtis, 85 W. Va. 37, 100 S.E. 856 (1919).
21
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has testified in an action before death, the party or interested
witness would also be competent to testify in the action.2" In all
cases, however, when one of these protected persons testify to a
particular transaction or communication with the deceased, the
door will not be opened to the adverse party to testify to any
transaction or communication with the deceased but will be limited
to the particular transaction or communication testified to by the
protected party."
The court has stated that there is another exception to the dead
man's statute which is not expressly found in it. The court in
Crothers"Admnr. v. Crothers,"8 stated that the dead man's statute
did not render any witness or party incompetent who was competent at common law. At common law a person interested in the
outcome of an action was competent to give evidence against
his own interest. The court declared that, "Children of a decedent,
who are his distributees, are competent witnesses to prove a
transfer by their father of personal estate in favor of the transferee." 9 By so testifying, they have testified against their own
interest and in favor of the other party.
Once the determination is made as to the types of action to which
the statute will be applicable and as to the instances when the
statute will not be invoked, the next step is to determine who is
disqualified under the dead man's statute. Here again, the statutes
vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The different types of
statutes that are most commonly found may be divided into three
groups: (1) Those statutes that only disqualify "parties"; (2)
Those statutes that only disqualify "parties" and "persons" interested
in the event of the action; and (3) Those statutes that extend the
disqualification to "assignors of" or "persons from or through whom"
such parties or interested persons derive their title, interest or
claim."0
See Moore v. Moore, 87 W. Va. 9, 104 S.E. 266 (1920).
Janes v. Felton, 99 W. Va. 407, 129 S.E. 482 (1925); Kernmel v.
Shroyer, 28 W. Va. 505 (1886).
2840 W. Va. 169, 20 S.E. 927 (1895); of. Speery v. Clark, 123 W. Va.
90, 13 S.E.2d 404 (1941).
29 Crothers' Adm'r v. Crothers, 40 W. Va. 169, 20 S.E. 927 (1895).
30 For a list of the states that come under each type of statute, see
Ray, supra note 10.
26

7
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New York has a statute which contains the disqualifications set
forth in the second and third classifications. 3' Under its terms, if
a party to the action is not interested in the outcome of the action,
he will not be disqualified. West Virginia's statute contains characteristics similar to those described in the second and third
classifications, but it is different from the New York statute in that
it disqualifies any party to an action, irrespective of his interest,
as well as any person interested in the event thereof. Therefore,
in West Virginia, even though a party to an action is not interested
in the outcome of the action, he will be disqualified as a witness
in respect to any personal transaction or communication between
him and the deceased. Both statutes, however, extend a person's
incompetency to anyone from whom the incompetent person may
32
have derived his title or interest.
One of the problems the courts have under the statutes which
come within the second type of classification is in determining
when a witness is interested in the outcome of an action. The
West Virginia Court has established a test which states: "By
common-law a person is a competent witness in a case if the
proceeding cannot be used as evidence for him, though he may
be interested in the question in issue, and may entertain wishes
on the subject and may even have occasion to test the same
question in his own case in a future suit."33 The court applied this
test in Coleman, Adm'x. v. Wallace. 4 In this case, the decedent
was adjudged insane by the Mental Hygiene Commission of
Greenbrier County on June 7, 1949, and her niece cared for her
until her death on February 27, 1952. The niece filed a claim for the
services rendered, and her claim was rejected by the circuit court.
On appeal the supreme court affirmed the lower court's action
and held that the niece was an interested party; therefore, she
could not testify in support of her claim. In Tilly v. Ellison,5
the court applied a different test to determine what degree of
interest will disqualify a witness. The court stated, "To exclude
a witness because of interest, under the statute, that interest is
tested by common law, and it must be a present, certain and vested
31 RicHARDsoN, op. cit. s-upra note 17 § 415.
32 W. VA. CODE, 57-3-1; see RcHmiADsoN, op.

cit. stpra note 17, § 415.
Crothers' Adm'r. v. Crothers, 40 W. Va. 169, 20 S.E. 927 (1895).
34 143 W. Va. 669, 104 S.E.2d 349 (1958).
35 107 W. Va. 402, 148 S.E. 380 (1929).
3
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interest; not uncertain, remote or contingent." In this case the
court held that the mere fact that the witness was a son-in-law
and closely associated in business with the party to the action would
not make him an interested person and render him incompetent
as a witness under the statute. Therefore, if a witness is not a party
to an action, he will not be disqualified as having an interest
solely on the basis that he is a close relative of a party to the
proceeding.3 6
In West Virginia, a party's incompetency is also imputed to his
or her spouse and renders them incompetent to testify as a witness
for his or her consort-party or a co-party in the action. This incompetency continues during the joint lives of the two spouses
unless the spouse who was a party to the action had been completely eliminated, then the surviving spouse would be competent
to testify for a co-party.37 This rule of imputation of incompetency seems to be based on a presumption of indentity of interest
of husband and wife and the common-law rule that they are to be
treated as one.
One of the most difficult jobs in administering the dead man's
statute is to determine the matters about which parties or interested
persons are prohibited to testify. The statute of one state renders
a person incompetent to testify as to all matters occuring before
the death of the decedent or adjudication of lunacy.3 8 However,
several of the states have statutes which provide that a party or a
person interested in the outcome of an action shall be incompetent
to testify as to any transaction with or statement by the decedent.3 '
West Virginia would be classified as having the latter type of
statute. The West Virginia statute provides that the party or
interested witness shall be incompetent to testify to any "personal
transaction or communication" between the party or interested witness and the deceased or insane person. This raises the question
what will constitute "personal transactions or communications".
The court has ruled, "The words 'personal transactions or communi36

1n re Estate of Fox, 131 W. Va. 429, 48 S.E.2d 1 (1948).
3
See Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W. Va. 170, 89 S.E.2d 695 (1955).
38
Carpenter, The Dead Man's Statute in Pennsylvania, 32 TEMP. L.Q.
399 39
(1959).
Ray, supra note 11.
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cations'. . . include every method whereby one person may derive
impressions or information from the conduct, condition or language
of another. 0 The courts of several states, including West Virginia,
have taken the position that a motor vehicle accident is a transaction within the meaning of the dead man's statute.4 1 Several other
acts in West Virginia have been held by the court to constitute a
personal transaction or communication, some of which are: the
execution of notes,42 contracts,43 services performed,44 payment of
rent,4" the mental and physical condition of an insane person,4 6
and an assault.4" Other courts have held that such acts as marriage
and the creation of a partnership shall constitute transactions within
the meaning of the dead man's statute.4" One can readily ascertain
from the above examples that the courts have given this section of
the statute a broad interpretation, thereby violating its spirit in
that it is supposed to be strictly construed. 9
The courts by giving the words "personal transactions or communications" a broad interpretation have been severely criticized
in the administration of the statute because of the harshness of the

court's decisions. One area of criticism has been that of automobile
collisions. A specific example in West Virginia can be pointed out
by the case of Strode v. Dyer.5" In this case, Joanne Strode, as
administratix of her husband, recovered from D for the wrongful
death of deceased as a result of a collision between the deceased's
automobile and the one driven by D. The trial court limited the
testimony of D and his wife, who was riding with him, to D's actions
at the time of the accident but refused to permit them to testify to
the actions and movements of the decedent. Judge Maxwell,
illustrating the harshness of this result, delivered a strong dissent
and stated that the statute should be strictly interpreted. In Will40
41

42

Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W. Va. 170, 89 S.E.2d 685 (1955).
See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1961).

Mann v. Peck, 139 W. Va. 487, 80 S.E.2d 518 (1954).

Poling v. Huffman, 48 W. Va. 639, 37 S.E. 526 (1900).
Mann v. Peck, 139 W. Va. 487, 80 S.E.2d 518 (1954).
45 Martufi v. Daniels, 99 W. Va. 673, 129 S.E. 709 (1925).
46
Trowbridge v. Stone, 42 W. Va. 45, 26 S.E. 363 (1896).
47 Clark v. Douglas, 139 W. Va. 691, 81 S.E.2d 112 (1954).
4816 Sw. L.J. 350 (1962).
49The West Virginia Court has stated that its statute is to be strictly
construed in order that it will not preclude the testimony of any witness
that does not clearly come within the letter of the statute. Sayre v. Whether43

44

bolt, 88 W. Va. 542, 107 S.E. 293 (1921).
50 115 W. Va. 733, 177 S.E. 878 (1934).
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hide v. Biggs,5" the court followed the same rule established by the
Strode case, but indicated that the rule is an undesirable one by
stating, "The Court is fully aware that the practical results of the
rule laid down in the Strode case may subject it to serious questions
....Any change should be the result of legislative policy and not
of judicial innovation."52 The legislature responded to the court's
suggestion by amending the statute in 1937, to provide that a person
being sued shall be competent to give evidence in a wrongful death
action except that the disqualification still remains as to any conversation with the deceased. 3
This amendment alleviated the harshness of the Dyer and the
Biggs decisions, but the question arises whether all the inequities
were eliminated, or whether there is a need for further change.
For this purpose it will be well to examine a hypothetical situation.
Suppose A and his wife are driving their car north on a country
highway. B, along with four passengers, is proceeding south on
the same highway at an extremely high rate of speed. As A
approaches a curve, B comes around the curve on A's side of the
road, and as a result a collision occurs in which B is killed. As the
statute now reads, A would be permitted to testify and give evidence
as to the actions of B in the event that A would be sued for B's
wrongful death. However, A does not have the same privileges
under the statute if A were to sue B's personal administrator for
A's injuries. A and his wife would be silenced under the statute
while the passengers riding with B would be permitted to testify.
Further, assume that both A and B were killed in the collision. If
B's personal administrator were to sue A's estate, A's wife would
probably be silenced under the statute because she is not being
sued for B's wrongful death and she would have an interest in the
outcome of the action. However, the passengers riding with B,
would be permitted to testify. Assume that A's personal administrator were to sue B's estate. Again, A's wife would be silenced under
the statute, while the passengers riding with B would be permitted
to testify. Is it just and equitable to render A and his wife incompetent as witnesses and permit the passengers who were riding
with B to testify?
51
52

118 W. Va. 160, 188 S.E. 876 (1936).

Wilhide v. Biggs, 118 W. Va. 160, 166, 188 S.E. 876 (1936).
53 W. VA. CODE, 57-3-1, supra note 19.
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Because of the problems that arise from the administration of
the dead man's statute when applied to automobile collisions, other
states have gone further than West Virginia. For example, in 1940,
New York amended its statute to provide that a person shall not be
incompetent to testify "as to the facts of an accident or the results
therefrom... by reason of the operation or ownership of a motor
vehicle being operated upon the highways of the state."54 Kentucky
in 1932, amended its statute to permit persons to testify for themselves in actions for personal injuries or for death from negligence
or tortious acts.5"
As a result of the harshness, complexity and the uncertainty in
the administration of the prohibitive type of dead man's statutes,
such as West Virginia's, several arguments have been propounded
against retaining them. Dean Wigmore points out that the present
disqualification under the dead man's statutes is subject to the same
objections that were used to repeal the "interest rule" nearly a century ago. He classifies these objections as follows: "(1) That the
supposed danger of interested persons testifying falsely exists to a
limited extent only; (2) That, even so, yet so far as they testify
truly, the exclusion is an intolerable injustice; (3) That no exclusion
can be so defined as to be rational, consistent, and workable .... "
In 1922, the Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth
Trust Fund of New York appointed a committee of judges, practitioners and professors to explore the feasibility of replacing this
prohibitive type of statute. The committee studied a permissive
type of statute which permits the interested witness and party to
testify by admitting into evidence the declarations and writings of
the deceased, to determine if such a liberal statute would be
acceptable in place of the prohibitive statutes of the other states.
The results of their inquiry were published in 1927.17 Upon the
5

4 ICLUDSON, op. cit. supra note 17, § 419. See Rost v. Kessler, 267
App. Div. 686 49 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1944).
.5 Catlettsburg v. Sulherland's Adm'r., 261 Ky. 535, 88 S.W.2d 19 (1935).
56 2 WicmomE, EVmENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940).
57 A sampling of their findings is as follows:
"These more liberal and
simpler statutes have the great practical advantage of being easily comprehended and administrated ....
Whether the provisions need amendment or
not, they are decidedly to be desired if they aid in the ascertainment of truth
rather than tend to encourage fraud or perjury. Upon the application of this
drastic test, all of the judges of the Supreme Courts found them good; only
one judge of the Common Pleas Court dissented, while one other was in
doubt. Therefore, out of 19 judges of the higher courts, 17, or over 89%,
believed that these provisions aid in the ascertainment of truth." TnE LAw
OF EvmENCE: Soim PnoposAuS FoR ITs REFORM, p. 31 (Yale Univ. Press,
1927).
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basis of this survey, the committee reached the conclusion that the
prohibitive type of statute was not necessary to provide protection
against false claims, but was an obstruction to the complete ascertainment of the truth. Therefore, the committee recommended
the adoption of a permissive statute, similar to the one found in
Connecticut. In 1937-38, the American Bar Association's Committee
on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence, which consisted of an
advisory member from each State and Territory and fifteen members at large, reviewed the above recommendation made by the
Commonwealth Trust Fund Committee, and voted forty-six in
favor of the recommendation and only three opposed. 8
In view of these arguments and recommendations, the lawyers and
others who live in a state that has the prohibitive type of statute
may be able to persuade the legislature to make a change. Thus, a
brief examination of the different alternatives that may be considered will be in order.
The first alternative would be a complete abrogation of the
dead man's statute.59 Massachusetts and Rhode Island are the
only States that do not have a dead man's statute. Futhermore, the
American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence"0 and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence have completely rejected the dead man's
rule.6 ' On the other hand, most legislatures would probably be
hestitant to completely repeal the statutes which have become
deeply rooted in the law of most the states. Although the majority
of the statutes need to be amended in order to permit an interested
witness or party to testify in the proper case, the concept that the
estate of the decedent or lunatic needs some protection is still
widely advocated.
A second alternative would be to adopt a statute similar to the
ones found in New Mexico, Oregon, The District of Columbia and
Virginia. These statutes provide for the admission of the testimony
58 For a full discussion on the Legal Research Committee of the Trust
Fund of New York and the American Bar Association's Committee on the
Improvement of the Laws of Evidence, see 2 WiGMoBE, EvmIcE § 578-

578a (3d ed. 1940).

J For a more complete discussion of these alternatives see Ray, Dead
Man's
6 0 Statutes, 24 Omo ST. L.J. 89 (1963).
MODEL CODE: OF EVIDENCE rule 101 (1942).
61 UNwoR
RuLr-s oF EvmENCE rule 7 (1953).
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of an interested witness or party, but only if the testimony can be
corroborated or buttressed by other and disinterested evidence.
The courts have disagreed as to what will constitute corroborating
evidence. Virginia courts hold that evidence which will confirm
and strengthen the testimony of the interested witness will constitute corroborating evidence, 2 however, it does not have to be
sufficient to support a judgment. 3 In the District of Columbia, the
corroborating evidence will be sufficient if it will lead reasonable
men to conclude that the survivor's testimony is probably true."
In New Mexico, the requirement for corroboration is that the evidence must be of the type which tends to establish an essential
fact necessary to recover." However, in Oregon, the interested
person will not be able to recover a judgment unless he establishes a
prima facie case without his own testimony. 6
While this seems to be an improvement over the more conventional statute, it still contains many undesirable features. First,
it is still extremely hard for an interested person to prove his claim
unless he has a good case without his own testimony. Thus, the
statute aids the interested person most when he probably would
not need it, because he has the corroborating evidence. In addition, the courts seem to have difficulty in determining what constitutes sufficient corroboration. In view of these undesirable
features, a different solution would probably be more desirable.
A third alternative would be to adopt a statute similar to the
ones found in Montana and Arizona."' While this type of statute
contains the familiar prohibitive language it provides that the trail
judge may in his discretion admit an interested survivor's testimony when it would clearly be unjust to exclude it.
Even though this statute seems to remedy the harshness of the
dead man's statute, it has been criticized as having serious defects.6"
Perhaps the greatest objection is that trial judges would be hesitant
62

Varner's Ex'r. v. White, 149 Va. 177, 140 S.E. 128 (1927).
Shenandoah Valley Natl. Bank v. Linebury, 179 Va. 734, 20 S.E.2d
541 (1942).
64Davis
v. Carmody, (Mun. Ct. App. Dist. Col.) 154 A.2d 132 (1959).
65 Vehn v. Bergman, 57 N.M. 351, 258 P.2d 734 (1953).
66
Vancil v. Poulson, 236 Or. 314, 388 P.2d 444 (1964).
67
MoT. REv. CoDE § 93-701-3 (1947); Amz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2251
(1956); Ray, supra note 59.
68 See Ray, supra note 59 at 110.
63
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to exercise their discretion in these cases. Another objection
is that the appellate courts might devise the rules for the trial
judges to follow and practically diminish their discretion. New
Hampshire had a statute similar to the one under discussion, but
it proved to be unworkable. 9 The statute was amended to give the
judge broader discretion, but again this proved to be unsuccessful;"'
therefore, it was again amended in 1953. Since New Hampshire
has found this type statute undesirable, perhaps another alternative would be more workable.
The fourth alternative and what appears to be the most desirable is a statute similar to the one first adopted in Connecticut."'
Under this statute all interested persons are rendered competent
to testify, but a counterpoise is provided as a safeguard by admitting relevant hearsay statements by the decedent. Connecticut
has been the pioneer in this approach, and its statute has served as
a model for other state statutes. South Dakota adopted a similar
statute in 1939.72 New Hampshire amended its former statute, that
had proved unworkable, in order to have a similar statute."
This has probably been the most workable statute. Reports on the
desirability of this solution have all been favorable, because it
prevents injustice and is capable of easily being interpreted by
the courts.
Considering all the cases that have been before the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in connection with the present dead
man's statute and the uncertainty as to its real meaning, perhaps, as
Professor Dadisman suggested, the time is ripe for the legislature to
reappraise the West Virginia's dead man's statute. 74 The adoption of
the Connecticut statute or one of similar purport would be a great
improvement for the bench and bar.
Ronald R. Brown
6

9 Ray, supra note 59 at 110.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.25 (1955).
71 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7895 (1949).
70

72
73

74

S.D. CODE § 36.0104 (1939).
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516.25 (1955); Ray, supra note 59 at 112.
Dadisman, The West Virginia Dead Manes Statute, 60 W. VA. L. REv.

239 (1958).
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